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I. INTRODUCTION
Courts traditionally view regulation of the energy sector as a dual federalism
framework in which a “bright line” separates sovereignty of the states from
the power reserved to federal regulators. In particular, the Federal Power Act
(FPA) grants the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) authority
over wholesale electricity markets.1 Courts generally interpret this authority
over wholesale markets as exclusive, which ensures the federal government
and states occupy different fields of the electric industry. States retain authority
in fields that bookend FERC’s power over wholesale markets— electric power
generation on one side and retail sales of electricity on the other.
Over time, changing technology and markets complicated the energy
sector, which in turn has blurred the formerly “bright lines” between not
only power generation and wholesale markets, but also between wholesale
markets and the retail sector. Recent United States Supreme Court (the Court)
decisions recognize this reality, and lower courts accordingly adapted their
approach to issues energy federalism. In short, courts have deemphasized
the traditional dual federalism framework in favor of a cooperative
federalism approach.2 In two 2016 decisions—FERC v. Electric Power
Supply Association (EPSA) and Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing, LLC—
the Court took a pragmatic approach to energy regulation at the boundaries
of state and federal authority.3 EPSA dealt with federal authority at the
interface of wholesale and retail markets, whereas Hughes dealt with the
interaction between state regulation of power generation and federal
regulation of wholesale markets.
The Court’s decisions in both EPSA and Hughes emphasize a cooperative
federalism approach to the energy field given the increasingly inextricable
link between power generation, wholesale markets, and retail sales of
electricity. As a result of this trend, lower courts are likely to exercise more
caution in finding state policy actions preempted by the FPA. While the
Court in Hughes did just that—invalidated a state regulation due to FPA
preemption—it cautioned lower courts to narrowly interpret its ruling.
In the wake of EPSA and Hughes, two recent district court cases and their
subsequent appeals help flesh out the contours of preemption at the
intersection of states’ authority to regulate power generation and FERC’s
authority to regulate wholesale power markets. Both district court cases
address state authority to create and administer Zero Emissions Credit

1. Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824 (1935).
2. See Jim Rossi, The Brave New Path of Energy Federalism, 95 TEX. L. REV. 399
(2016).
3. FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016); Hughes v. Talen Energy
Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288 (2016).
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(ZEC) programs, which are meant to subsidize and extend the operating
life of aging and uneconomic nuclear power plants.4
In Village of Old Mill Creek v. Star, plaintiffs challenged a ZEC program
created when the Illinois Legislature passaged the Future Energy Jobs Act.5
In Coalition for Competitive Electricity, Dynegy Inc. v. Zibelman, plaintiffs
challenged a ZEC program created by the New York Public Service
Commission (PSC) when it adopted a Clean Energy Standard (CES) Order.6
Judges in both district court cases upheld the state ZEC programs when
they found the ZEC programs were not preempted by the FPA.7 Both
decisions also withstood scrutiny on appeal when the Second (Village of Old
Mill Creek) and Seventh (Coalition for Competitive Electricity) Circuits affirmed
the lower court rulings.
Part II of this Article briefly reviews how the electric sector functions
and its substantial evolution over the last few decades. Part III discusses the
traditional dual federalism approach to regulation in the energy sector and
how the 2016 Supreme Court decisions transitioned the regulatory scheme
towards a cooperative federalism framework. Part IV analyzes the ZEC
cases and addresses the lower and appellate courts’ rationales in Village
of Old Mill Creek and Coalition for Competitive Electricity, with focus on
the preemption analyses under EPSA and Hughes. Finally, Part V discusses
implications of the 2016 Supreme Court cases, the ZEC cases, and recent
FERC actions related to state policies designed to encourage new or clean
power generation.
II. THE ELECTRIC SECTOR
For most of the last century, the electric sector functioned in a uniform
and predictable manner. Municipal or investor-owned utilities (MOUs or
IOUs, respectively) produced power in large generating facilities and
subsequently transmitted and distributed that electric power to retail
consumers. These utilities operated as regulated, vertically integrated
4. ZECs are state-created tradable commodities which represent the environmental
attributes of one megawatt-hour of nuclear power generation. Zero Emission Credits, NUCLEAR
ENERGY INST. 3 (Apr. 2018), https://www.nei.org/CorporateSite/media/filefolder/resources/
reports-and-briefs/zero-emission-credits-201804.pdf [https://perma.cc/4QYD-7EGW].
5. Village of Old Mill Creek v. Star, Nos. 17-CV-1163 & 17-CV-1164, 2017 WL
3008289 (N.D. Ill. 2017), aff’d, 904 F.3d 518 (7th Cir. 2018).
6. Coal. for Competitive Elec., Dynegy Inc. v. Zibelman, 272 F. Supp. 3d 554
(S.D.N.Y. 2017), aff’d, 906 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2018).
7. See infra Part IV.
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monopolies in confined geographic areas.8 Beginning with the Public Utility
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA), this structure started to change.
Congress enacted PURPA to encourage efficient cogeneration (the use of
heat from industrial processes to generate electricity) and small renewable
generation facilities (with capacity less than 80 megawatts (MW)).9 As
implemented by states, PURPA-related programs certified qualifying
facilities (QFs) to generate power and then required utilities to purchase
the power.10 Each purchase price was set at a state-determined rate that
constituted the utilities’ avoided cost of producing the power themselves.11
In contrast, the monopoly model did not obligate utilities that owned
transmission and distribution networks to allow independent power producers
(IPPs) open access to utilities’ systems. The Energy Policy Act of 1992
gave FERC the authority to grant such access to transmission lines.12 In
1996, FERC issued Order 888 which mandated open access to transmission
networks.13 These changes allowed IPPs to proliferate, and they now operate
nationwide. In some states, regulators required vertically integrated IOUs
to divest their generating assets in the name of market competition.14 When
FERC passed Order 2000 in the year 2000, it encouraged, but did not require,
the creation of nonprofit entities to manage wholesale markets and electric
grid operations. These nonprofit entities are known as Regional Transmission
Organizations (RTOs) or Independent System Operators (ISOs).15 Seven
such entities now manage their respective regions around the country,
encompassing the most populated areas of the United States in their aggregated
geographic area.16
Although these developments primarily affected the regulatory boundary
between power generation and wholesale sales of electricity, recent technological
developments also altered the landscape of the retail energy sector. For
8. Robert R. Nordhaus, The Hazy “Bright Line”: Defining Federal and State Regulation
of Today’s Energy Grid, 36 ENERGY L. J. 203, 207 (2015) (“Utilities were largely vertically
integrated. Power flowed from large central-station generating facilities through highvoltage transmission systems either for sale at wholesale to other utilities or for delivery
through local distribution facilities to end-users”).
9. FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N, DIV. OF ENERGY MKT. OVERSIGHT OFF. OF ENF’T,
ENERGY PRIMER: A HANDBOOK OF ENERGY MARKET BASICS 39 (2015).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 61 Fed. Reg. 21540-01 (May 10, 1996).
14. See generally, Severin Bornstein & James Bushnell, The U.S. Electric Industry
After 20 Years of Restructuring, 7 ANN. REV. ECON. 437, 443 (2015) (discussing restructuring
of ownership of generation assets and “the divestiture of much of the existing generation
fleet previously owned by IOUs in restructured states . . . .”).
15. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 65 Fed. Reg. 12088-01 (Mar. 8, 2000); Rossi,
supra note 2, at 423.
16. Rossi, supra note 2, at 423.
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example, distributed generation or distributed energy resources (DER), such
as rooftop solar photovoltaic (PV), effectively turns traditional consumers
into small generators.17 When distributed generators produce more energy
than they consume, utility companies must buy the excess, rendering these
consumers wholesale producers.18 Additional developments now occur
with demand-side management wherein utilities pay customers to reduce
demand at periods of peak load.19 This is often viewed as beneficial to
utilities due to high marginal prices they must typically pay to produce
power in times of peak demand.20 Developments like DER and demandside management have disrupted traditional energy markets and further
obscured the boundary between the traditionally distinct retail and wholesale
sectors.
III. FROM DUAL FEDERALISM TO COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM
As discussed above, changes in the electric sector throughout the past
several decades blurred the traditional lines between power generation,
wholesale markets, and the retail sector. Courts demonstrated recognition
of this with rulings that gradually shifted away from a dual energy federalism
approach toward a cooperative federalism framework. This section first
explains the history of courts’ bright line approach to determine FERC’s
and states’ respective regulatory spheres. It then addresses the shift to a
cooperative federalism framework with an in-depth discussion of Court’s
decisions in EPSA and Hughes.
A. The Traditional Dual Federalism Framework
Congress passed the FPA in 1935 to address regulatory gaps in the electric
sector caused by the federal government’s lack of express authority to
regulate interstate energy markets.21 Though it took years before Congress
passed the FPA, these regulatory issues were brought to the forefront in
the 1920s when the Court decided Public Utilities Commission v. Attleboro
17.
18.

Bornstein & Bushnell, supra note 14, at 461.
OWEN ZINAMEN, ET AL., GRID-CONNECTED DISTRIBUTED GENERATION: COMPENSATION
MECHANICS BASICS, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB. 7 (2017) (“The [distributed generation]
system exports all electricity directly to the utility grid, and the system owner is compensated at a
predetermined and typically fixed sell rate either through utility bill credits or in cash.”).
19. Rossi, supra note 2, at 444–46.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 408.
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Steam & Electric Co.22 The case involved a Rhode Island utility that had
a twenty two-year electric supply contract with Attleboro, a Massachusetts
company. Attleboro sued after the Rhode Island utility company received
approval for a rate increase by the Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission.
The Supreme Court found that neither Massachusetts nor Rhode Island
had authority to regulate the rate for the interstate contract—only Congress
may do so.23 This regulatory void between interstate energy contracts became
known as the “Attleboro gap,” and it was a significant motivation in passing
the FPA.24
For many decades after Congress passed the FPA, the Supreme Court
analyzed energy regulation under a dual federalism framework in which
it relied on a judicially-determined bright line to separate federal and state
jurisdiction.25 Courts treated state and federal spheres of regulatory power
as exclusive wherein federal regulators occupied the entire sphere of wholesale
electricity sales.26 In practice, however, courts were often forced to resort
to case-by-case analyses of how state and federal energy regulations interacted
to determine whether a state law was preempted.27 Thus, the bright line
notion provide something of a fiction, but courts still appealed to bright
line and formalistic applications of field preemption.28 That said, recent
Supreme Court decisions more definitively moved energy federalism in a
new direction.
B. The Move to Cooperative Federalism
The traditional dual federalism framework in the electric sector is in a
state of deterioration.29 The industry fundamentally changed in the last
several decades and, in the process, blurred the lines between traditional
divisions of power generation, wholesale sales, and retail services. For
example, the electric grid now functions bi-directionally with distributed
generation.30 Further, traditionally passive consumers of electricity may
now participate in and affect energy markets through both power generation
and demand response programs.31 The latter inserts customers directly into
wholesale markets. Such developments undermine the traditional dual
22. Pub. Util. Comm’n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83, 88 (1927).
23. Id. at 90.
24. Rossi, supra note 2, at 409.
25. Id. at 414.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 421.
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., Hannah J. Wiseman, Moving Past Dual Federalism to Advance Electric
Grid Neutrality, 100 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 97–100, 107–08 (2015).
30. E.g., OWEN ZINAMEN, ET AL., supra note 18.
31. Id.
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federalism framework and demand a more flexible conception of state and
federal authority under the FPA.
The Supreme Court met this conceptual challenge in 2016 when it decided
EPSA and Hughes. In EPSA, the Court upheld a FERC rule that required
wholesale market operators to compensate demand response providers at
the same rate as power generators.32 The Court found that FERC acted within
its authority and that the rule did not regulate retail prices, despite having
some effect on them.33 In Hughes, the Court invalidated a Maryland law
designed to encourage in-state generation facilities after it found the law
effectively set prices for a wholesale energy market, thus “disregarding”
the market-set price.34 While EPSA and Hughes dealt with different boundaries
of federal and state authority—the former with the intersection of wholesale
and retail markets and the latter with the intersection of wholesale markets
and power generation—EPSA nevertheless affected the Court’s analysis
in Hughes, as described below.35
1. FERC v. Electric Power Supply Association (EPSA)
EPSA involved a dispute over the regulation of demand response—a
practice where market operators or utilities pay retail customers to not use
energy during specified times.36 Demand response is typically used during
periods of peak demand—for instance, on the hottest summer days when
consumers’ air conditioning use leads to some of the highest electric loads
of the year. By paying customers to reduce consumption, market operators
can provide cheaper and more reliable energy than if they were required to
produce additional energy supply to meet peak demand.37 The FERC rule
at issue in EPSA required market operators to compensate for demand response
at the same rate at which they compensate for additional energy production.
Justice Kagan set the tone in the Court’s majority opinion when she
immediately acknowledged that the statutory division between wholesale
and retail sales, “generates a steady flow of jurisdictional disputes because—
in point of fact if not of law—the wholesale and retail markets in electricity

32. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 766–67, 784 (2016).
33. Id. at 784.
34. Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1298–99 (2016).
35. Additionally, Part IV, supra, discusses how lower courts interpret and consider the
two cases together in breaking down the traditional bright line barriers of dual federalism.
36. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. at 767.
37. FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N, supra note 9, at 44.
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are inextricably linked.”38 EPSA first required the Court to decide whether
FERC had authority to regulate demand response, so it was key for the majority
to immediately acknowledge the close relationship between markets. In
finding FERC had authority to regulate demand response, the Court looked
to the FPA which specifies that FERC’s authority extends to any rule or
practice “affecting” wholesale electricity rates.39 This aspect of the case
turned on how to define FERC’s “affecting” jurisdiction and how it applied
to FERC’s rule regarding demand response compensation. The Court adopted
the D.C. Circuit’s, “common-sense construction of the FPA’s language,
limiting FERC’s ‘affecting’ jurisdiction to rules or practices that ‘directly
affect the [wholesale] rate.’”40 The Court noted this pragmatic approach was
necessary to keep the statute from assuming “near-infinite breadth.”41
The Court then applied this newly clarified “direct effect” test and found
the demand response commitments in FERC’s rule easily met the standard.42
However, because the FPA reserves to states the authority to regulate all
retail sales, the Court had to further determine whether FERC’s demand
response compensation rule improperly regulated retail sales. The Court
determined FERC’s rule did not improperly regulate retail sales, even if it
had a substantial effect on such sales.43 The Majority noted that in a modern
economy, wholesale and retail markets will inevitably affect one another, so
will regulations in these sectors necessarily will, too.44 Thus, the FERC rule
permissibly governed a practice directly affecting wholesale rates, and the
incidental effect on retail rates was immaterial.
Finally, Justice Kagan discussed a particular feature of FERC’s demand
response compensation rule which gave states the ability to prohibit consumers
from making demand response bids in the wholesale market.45 Justice Kagan
explicitly called the rule a, “program of cooperative federalism, in which
the [s]tates retain the last word.”46 However, the Court was silent in regard
to the use of dual federalism as an organizing principal for these jurisdictional
issues.
The Court justified its conclusion that FERC acted within its authority
when it noted the contrary view would conflict with the FPA’s fundamental

38. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. at 766.
39. Id. at 767.
40. Id. at 774 (quoting Cal. Indep. System Operator Corp. v. FERC, 372 F.3d 395, 402
(2004)).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 774–74.
43. Id. at 776.
44. Id.
45. This feature effectively provided states an opportunity to opt out of the FERC
demand response compensation rule.
46. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. at 780.
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purpose of providing just and reliable electricity: “FERC set the terms of
transactions occurring in the organized wholesale markets, so as to ensure
the reasonableness of wholesale prices and the reliability of the interstate
grid—just as the FPA contemplates.”47 Such emphasis on the FPA’s purpose
further demonstrates the Court is willing to consider legislative intent in
energy sector regulation, rather than opting for strict textual interpretations of
power divisions in this context. EPSA strongly influenced the Court in Hughes,
which addressed the federal-state regulatory boundary on the other side of
wholesale sales: the line between power generation and wholesale markets.
2. Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing, LLC
In Hughes, the Court determined the FPA preempted a Maryland law
designed to encourage new electricity generation in the state.48 The Maryland
program provided subsidies to new power generators but conditioned receipt
of these subsidies on the new generator’s ability to sell its capacity into
a FERC-regulated capacity market.49
The Maryland Public Service Commission (PSC) promulgated a Generation
Order that solicited and accepted a bid for a new gas-fired power plant.50
The State required load-serving entities (LSEs)—utilities that supply electricity
to retail customers—to enter into a 20-year contract with the winner of the
bid, CPV Maryland, LLC (CPV). The arrangement was structured as a
“contract for differences” wherein CPV would bid its capacity into the PJM
capacity market.51 If the bid was accepted and the market clearing price
was below the price guaranteed in the 20-year contract, Maryland LSEs
would be required to pay CPV the difference and pass the cost on to
Maryland consumers or “end-users” of this electricity.52 If the market
clearing price exceeded the amount guaranteed in the 20-year contract,

47. Id. at 784.
48. Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1292 (2016).
49. Id. A capacity market is a type of wholesale electricity market based on power
generators guaranteeing to provide a certain amount of generating capacity in the future,
regardless of whether it is called upon to actually produce power. See generally Adam
James, Explainer: How Capacity Markets Work, ENERGY NEWS NETWORK (June 17, 2013),
https://energynews.us/2013/06/17/midwest/explainer-how-capacity-markets-work/ [https://
perma.cc/Y6LL-T5YM].
50. Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1294.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1295.
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CPV would pay the difference to the LSEs.53 For CPV to receive any
payments, its bids had to clear the PJM capacity auction.54
The Court found that Maryland’s program functionally set the rate CPV
received for sales in the PJM auction.55 The Court determined the program,
“contraven[ed] the FPA’s division of authority between state and federal
regulators.”56 The problem, the Court reasoned, was that by guaranteeing
CPV a certain rate for capacity sales regardless of the market clearing price,
Maryland disregarded a rate that FERC deemed per se just and reasonable
by operation of the PJM auction.57 Under Supreme Court precedent, “[s]tates
interfere with FERC’s authority by disregarding interstate wholesale rates
FERC has deemed just and reasonable, even when [s]tates exercise their
traditional authority over retail rates or, as here, in-state generation.”58
If the Court ended its analysis there, it would have left open the door to
preemption because many subsidies states might pay to power generators
could be perceived as functionally setting the rate the generator receives.
Doing so may easily cause generators to disregard wholesale rates. However,
in the final paragraph of its opinion, the Court expressly tried to limit the
scope of its holding:
Our holding is limited: We reject Maryland’s program only because it disregards
an interstate wholesale rate required by FERC. We therefore need not and do not
address the permissibility of various other measures States might employ to encourage
development of new or clean generation, including tax incentives, land grants, direct
subsidies, construction of state-owned generation facilities, or re-regulation of the
energy sector. Nothing in this opinion should be read to foreclose Maryland and
other States from encouraging production of new or clean generation through measures
“untethered to a generator’s wholesale market participation.” So long as a State
does not condition payment of funds on capacity clearing the auction, the State’s
program would not suffer from the fatal defect that renders Maryland’s program
unacceptable.59

In Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence, she described the FPA as a collaborative
federalism statute that, “envisions a federal-state relationship marked by
interdependence.”60 She cautioned that, “[p]reemption inquiries related to such
collaborative programs are particularly delicate.”61 Justice Sotomayor further
emphasized the Court, “rightly recognizes the importance of protecting the
53. Id.
54. Id. PJM Interconnection is the region’s RTO.
55. Id. at 1296.
56. Id. at 129697.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1299 (citing Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 956
(1986); Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Miss. ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 373 (1988)).
59. Id. (internal citations omitted, emphasis added).
60. Id. at 1300.
61. Id.
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[s]tates’ ability to contribute, within their regulatory domain, to the [FPA’s]
goal of ensuring a sustainable supply of efficient and price-effective energy.”62
Although Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence is non-binding, it is nonetheless
illustrative of the demonstrable shift in how the Court views the regulatory
framework in the energy sector. As with Justice Kagan’s majority opinion
in EPSA, Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in Hughes rejected a formalistic
approach to preemption and the divisions of state and federal jurisdiction.
Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence showed unequivocally that she abandoned
any notions of dual federalism in favor of collaborative energy regulation,
and she further suggested courts should tread lightly in their preemption
inquiries going forward. Justices Kagan and Sotomayor emphasized in their
respective analyses the importance of scrutinizing the purposes of both the
FPA and the regulation at issue. Further, it is important to note Justice
Sotomayor’s concurrence in Hughes because the district court judges in the
ZEC cases seem to regard her words as clear and strong declarations of a
new direction in energy federalism.
IV. ZERO EMISSIONS CREDITS AND FEDERAL PREEMPTION
EPSA and Hughes emphasize the interrelated nature of wholesale markets
with retail sales and power generation, as well as the cooperative nature of
contemporary energy federalism. That said, the Court in both cases ruled
in favor of federal authority. The Court demonstrably did so in Hughes
when it found preemption of state action related to power generation.63
So, while aspects of EPSA and Hughes suggest that states may enjoy some
latitude when they implement programs that affect wholesale markets, the
decisions themselves do not strongly declare this. Rather, the extent of this
latitude will be determined by subsequent cases brought in response to state
programs or laws that affect wholesale markets in various ways. The two
challenges to state ZEC programs discussed in this section help clarify state
policy latitude and map the direction future cases may take. Judges in these
cases, at both district and circuit court levels, took cues from the Supreme
Court’s focus on the purpose of the FPA in EPSA and Hughes. In particular,
the opinions highlighted Justice Sotomayor’s suggestion in Hughes that a
court should use, “the purpose of the [FPA] as the ‘ultimate touchstone’ of its

62.
63.

Id.
Id. at 1299. See also supra text accompanying notes 55–58.
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preemption inquiry, rather than resting on generic preemption frameworks
unrelated to the [FPA].”64
A. Village of Old Mill Creek v. Star
In Village of Old Mill Creek, two sets of plaintiffs—electricity customer
groups and an industry group representing competitive power producers—
challenged the creation of a ZEC commodity that subsidized nuclear power
generation in Illinois.65 The 2016 Future Energy Jobs Act, an amendment
to the Illinois Power Agency Act, established ZECs as tradable credits which
represented the environmental attributes of one MW-hour of energy from
a zero emission facility (defined as a nuclear facility in the statute).66 The
program grants ZECs to certain qualifying nuclear power facilities, and
electric utilities must then purchase ZECs from these facilities and pass
the costs on to their retail customers. Additional revenue from the sale of
ZECs enables these nuclear facilities to bid into wholesale market auctions at
prices lower than they otherwise would without ZEC sales. Plaintiffs in Village
of Old Mill Creek argued the FPA preempted the Illinois ZEC program.67
The district court tackled the preemption inquiry in two steps: it first
employed the “field preemption” test, and then it applied the “conflict
preemption” test, devoting the bulk of its analysis to the former.68 “Field
preemption” of a state law occurs when the law regulates within a field that
Congress intended be occupied exclusively by the Federal Government.69
State laws are “conflict preempted” when the regulation at issue actually
conflicts with federal law.70 In analyzing the field preemption claim, the
court cited EPSA to emphasize that wholesale markets have natural and
inevitable consequences on retail markets.71 Although EPSA addressed the
issue of FERC encroaching on state authority, the court in Village of Old
Mill Creek reasoned that this encroachment analysis applied equally in the
opposite direction—state regulations may also affect federally regulated
wholesale markets.72
The Village of Old Mill Creek court also cited Hughes when it distinguished
the Illinois ZEC program from the Maryland law at issue in Hughes; qualifying
nuclear facilities in Illinois may receive ZECs even if they neither clear nor

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

12

Id. at 1300 (emphasis added, internal citations omitted).
Village of Old Mill Creek v. Star, 2017 WL 3008289, at *1.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *10.
Id.
Id. at *10.
Id.
Id. at *12 (citing FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 776 (2016)).
Id.
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participate in the capacity auction.73 The court reasoned that, in reading EPSA
and Hughes together, “preemption applies whenever a tether to wholesale
rates is indistinguishable from a direct effect on wholesale rates.74 The
qualifier ‘direct’ is important; the court concluded that influencing the market
by subsidizing a participant, without subsidizing the actual wholesale transaction
itself, is indirect and thus not preempted.”75
The court in Village of Old Mill Creek also compared ZECs to the more
common state energy commodity known as renewable energy credits or
certificates (RECs). In an earlier adjudication, FERC held that when RECs
are “unbundled” (i.e., sold independently of electricity), REC sales fall outside
of FERC’s jurisdiction.76 The court in Village of Old Mill Creek found FERC’s
reasoning persuasive in that environmental attributes of power generation
may be unbundled from the sale of electricity, thus avoiding FPA preemption.77
In sum, the court found the FPA did not preempt the Illinois state program
under a theory of field preemption because the ZEC transactions were
sufficiently separate from wholesale energy auctions. In conclusion, the
court noted, “Hughes should not be extended to invalidate laws that do
not include an express condition, but that in practice (when combined with
other market forces) have the effect of conditioning payment on clearing
the wholesale auction.”78 This is a fairly narrow distinction from Hughes but
one in which the court seemed confident in light of its ultimate holding.
In particular, the court’s parting sentiment for Hughes specified, “[s]o long as
a [s]tate does not condition payment of funds on capacity clearing the auction,
the [s]tate’s program would not suffer from the fatal defect that renders
Maryland’s program unacceptable.”79
The Village of Old Mill Creek court also briefly addressed conflict
preemption when it asked whether the state program did “clear damage”
to the goals of federal legislation.80 The court cited Justice Sotomayor’s

73. Id. at *13.
74. Id. The court’s use of the word “tether” here is in reference to Hughes, which
suggested states were free to encourage production of new or clean generation through
measures, “untethered to a generator’s wholesale market participation.” Hughes v. Talen
Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1299 (2016). The Hughes plaintiffs attempted to use the
“tethering” language to frame their preemption argument. Id.
75. Village of Old Mill Creek, 2017 WL 3008289, at *13.
76. WSPP, Inc., 139 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,061 (Apr. 20, 2012).
77. Village of Old Mill Creek, 2017 WL 3008289, at *13.
78. Id.
79. Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 U.S. 1288, 1299 (2016).
80. Village of Old Mill Creek, 2017 WL 3008289, at *14.
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Hughes concurrence which cautioned courts, “not to confuse congressionally
designed interplay between regulations for impermissible tension that requires
preemption.”81 The court found that while subsidizing nuclear power via
ZECs may distort the wholesale market, FERC has authority to address the
issue and had not yet chosen to do so. Thus, because FERC could intervene
if it determined the program undermined just and reasonable wholesale
rates, there could be no conflict.82 Consequently, the district court granted
defendants’ motions to dismiss the suit. Plaintiffs subsequently appealed.
B. Village of Old Mill Creek on Appeal
On appeal in the Seventh Circuit, the case became known as Electric
Power Supply Association v. Star.83 A three-judge panel at the Seventh
Circuit expressed concern that FERC had not weighed in on whether the
Illinois ZEC program interfered with federal authority and therefore asked
FERC to file an amicus curiae brief.84 FERC obliged and filed a brief in
support of the defendants-respondents, asserting the ZEC program was
not preempted under Hughes.85 Like the lower court, FERC reiterated that
the program did not require participation in the FERC-regulated wholesale
market and emphasized that any, “spillover, indirect effect [of the policy]
on wholesale electricity markets . . . does not warrant preemption.”86 FERC
further highlighted that the two nuclear plants at issue that would be
eligible to receive ZECs sold electricity outside of the wholesale auctions
through bilateral contracts.87
FERC also noted in its brief that several plaintiffs in the case filed a related
administrative complaint with FERC, which was pending resolution at the
time FERC filed its brief in the case.88 In the related FERC administrative
hearing, plaintiffs alleged PJM’s failure to address “price suppressive” effects
of state policies supporting certain types of energy generation—the Illinois
ZEC program included—constituted unjust and unreasonable rates under the
FPA.89 FERC noted that after it issued an order on that (or any other) proceeding,
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. Star, 904 F. 3d 518 (7th Cir. 2018).
84. Id. at 522.
85. Brief for the U.S. and FERC as Amici Curiae in Support of Defendants-Respondents
and Affirmance, Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. Star, 904 F.3d 518 (7th Cir. 2018) (No. 052433).
86. Id. at 7.
87. Id. at 11.
88. Id. at 4–5; Calpine Corp. v. PJM Interconnection, LLC, 163 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,236
(June 29, 2018).
89. Brief for the U.S. and FERC, Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. Star, 904 F.3d 518
(7th Cir. 2018) (No. 05-2433), supra note 85, at 4–5.
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any aggrieved party would be able to seek rehearing in front of FERC and
ultimately dispute any FERC-issued order in the courts.90
In its brief, FERC agreed with the district court’s arguments and
succinctly stated FERC’s views on the role of preemption in modern energy
jurisprudence as follows:
Hughes joins a line of prior [Supreme] Court decisions that, in the context of energy
regulation, interpret the law on preemption with some measure of modesty. In those
cases, the Court found that incidental effects of state regulation on matters of
federal concern do not rise to the level of preempting those state laws—what matters,
in terms of the constitutional preemption concern, is whether the challenged state
laws target those areas reserved by Congress for federal regulation.91

FERC explained to the Seventh Circuit that it, “need not, and should not, resort
here to the extraordinary and blunt remedy of preemption.”92 FERC thus
seemed to suggest states have wide latitude to regulate power generation
without facing preemption, specifically because FERC may exercise its
authority under the FPA to address any state policy which might render
wholesale markets unjust or unreasonable.93
The Seventh Circuit, in affirming the district court, frequently referenced
both Hughes and the FERC amici brief, as well as FERC’s decisions regarding
the administrative proceeding discussed in its brief. Specifically, in the
FERC proceedings, PJM sought to institute new rules in its capacity auction
that would alter how state-supported generators, like those receiving ZECs or
RECs, could bid.94 FERC did not approve PJM’s proposal and instead opened
a new hearing, Calpine Corp. v. PJM Interconnection, LLC, to determine if and
what changes should be instituted in the PJM market.95
FERC discussed how PJM might address the price-distorting effects of
state subsidies for specific resources. Specifically, FERC proposed a twopart solution to address the problem while respecting states’ ability to regulate
power generation. First, FERC proposed a more expansive minimum offer
price rule (MOPR), which functionally created a price floor in capacity markets.96
90. Id. at 6 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 825l(a)). See also 16 U.S.C. § 825l(b) (providing for
judicial review of any FERC-issued order).
91. Brief for the U.S. and FERC, Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. Star, 904 F.3d 518
(7th Cir. 2018) (No. 05-2433), supra note 85, at 18.
92. Id. at 20.
93. Id.
94. 163 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,236, at ¶¶ 4, 14.
95. Id. at ¶¶ 7–8, 63. As of this writing, the FERC paper hearing concerning PJM rules
for state subsidies of specific resources is ongoing.
96. Id. at ¶¶ 157–58.

15

FLAHERTY2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

8/9/2019 3:53 PM

Second, FERC proposed a Fixed Resource Rate (FRR) alternative rule, which
would allow load-serving entities to remove a specific resource type (e.g.,
nuclear plants supported by ZECs) and its corresponding load from the
capacity market.97 FERC noted these proposed changes would, “essentially
create a bifurcated capacity construct.”98
Although the Village of Old Mill Creek plaintiffs insisted FERC’s actions
were evidence of preemption, the appellate court disagreed. Rather, FERC’s
actions were evidence of an appropriate regulatory interplay between states
and FERC when state policies affect interstate sales. Citing Hughes, the
court noted that such effects, “do not lead to preemption; they are instead
an inevitable consequence of a system in which power is shared between
state and national governments.”99 Echoing FERC’s brief, the Seventh Circuit
concluded that any final decision from FERC would be subject to judicial
review: “[t]he need to make adjustments in light of states’ exercise of their
lawful powers does not diminish the scope of those powers.”100
C. Coalition for Competitive Electricity, Dynegy Inc. v. Zibelman
As part of a comprehensive effort to address greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions, the New York Public Service Commission (PSC) issued a Clean
Energy Standard (CES) Order creating ZECs, which—like ZECs in Illinois’
program—represent the environmental attributes of nuclear power generation.101
Under the program, nuclear generators are eligible for ZECs if they make
a showing of “public necessity,” meaning that the facility’s revenues, “are
at a level that is insufficient to preserve the zero-emission environmental
values or attributes historically provided by the facility.”102 The New York
State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) purchases
the ZECs from qualifying facilities, thus subsidizing ZEC production.103
The ZECs are then sold to load-serving entities (LSEs), which are required
to buy an amount proportional to the amount of energy their customers
consume—as in Illinois, these costs may then be passed on to customers.104

97. Id. at ¶¶ 60–61. PJM’s existing FRR allows utilities to opt out of the capacity
market if they are able to meet their power demand with their own generation resources,
but it requires removing one’s entire generation footprint. See id. at ¶ 160.
98. Id. at ¶ 161.
99. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. Star, 904 F.3d 518, 524 (7th Cir. 2018).
100. Id.
101. Coal. for Competitive Elec., Dynegy Inc. v. Zibelman, 272 F. Supp. 3d 554, 560–61
(S.D.N.Y. 2017).
102. Id. at 562.
103. Id. at 561–62.
104. Id. See also Village of Old Mill Creek, 2017 WL 3008289, at *1.
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Plaintiffs in Coalition for Competitive Electricity argued the FPA
preempted New York’s ZEC program.105 In rejecting this argument, the
district court relied on Hughes when it noted the “ultimate touchstone” in
considering the FPA’s preemptive effect is Congress’s purpose in enacting
the law.106 The court first considered the field preemption issues before it
turned to conflict preemption.
The court began its analysis of the field preemption claim by declaring
the FPA a “paragon of cooperative federalism,” quoting Justice Sotomayor’s
concurrence in Hughes.107 Plaintiffs recognized the significant role of
Hughes in this realm and therefore framed their argument in the language
of that case. Plaintiffs contended that even if nuclear generators were not
required to participate in the wholesale market, the ZEC program was still
“tethered” to the wholesale auction because nuclear generators who
received ZECs would of course sell their power into wholesale markets.108
Unfortunately for plaintiffs, the district court was unconvinced by this argument.
The court noted, “nuclear generators receive ZECs for their zero-emissions
production of energy and not for the sale of that energy into the wholesale
market.”109 The CES Order itself mentioned neither wholesale auctions
nor whether generators must sell into the auctions. The court also relied
on the fact that “ZEC sales and wholesale sales of energy or capacity are
entirely separate transactions . . . and neither one [is] conditioned on the other,”
like the payments were in Hughes.110
Similar to the court in Village of Old Mill Creek, the court in Coalition
for Competitive Electricity noted plaintiffs were unable to distinguish ZECs
from RECs, and FERC concluded the latter fell outside its jurisdiction in
WSPP.111 For the court, plaintiffs’ failure to distinguish ZECs from RECs
was the, “death knell for [p]laintiffs’ field-preemption argument.”112 The
district court found both ZECs and RECs of credits to be legally indistinguishable
in terms of their effects on wholesale auctions. If the court found the REC
program was not preempted—as FERC held in WSPP—then, likewise,
the court could not find the ZEC program preempted either.113
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 569.
Id. at 567 (citing Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1297 (2016)).
Id. (citing Hughes, 136 U.S. at 1297).
Id. at 569–70.
Id. at 570.
Id. at 572 (emphasis added).
Id. at 573 (citing 139 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,061, at ¶¶ 18, 21, 24).
Id.
Id. at 573–74.
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The court next analyzed the conflict preemption claim. Plaintiffs alleged
the ZEC program interfered with FERC’s intent to base wholesale auctions
on market-based principles designed to encourage efficient generation.114
In response, the court explained that even if efficient generation was one
of FERC’s goals, the ZEC program presented no conflict. By incentivizing
clean energy, the ZEC program would minimize environmental damage
caused by generating electricity with fossil fuels.115 The court contended
this would in fact be a more efficient outcome when it further explained
that the ZEC program functioned to correct market failures and enhance
social welfare.116 The court also reasoned that FERC may intervene if
it thought the ZEC program interfered with its objectives.117
D. Coalition for Competitive Electricity on Appeal
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision.118
The court began its review by noting the FPA establishes a “collaborative
scheme” between the states and the federal government in the regulatory
field of electricity generation.119 When it addressed field preemption, the
Second Circuit looked to the narrow holding in Hughes and relied on similar
reasoning as the district court and courts in the Illinois ZEC case.120 The
court noted that unlike the program in Hughes, nuclear plants’ ability to
receive ZECs in the instant case was not contingent on participation in
wholesale electricity markets.121 Like the Seventh Circuit, the Second Circuit
noted the possibility of ZEC plants operating outside of wholesale markets
altogether through direct sales to individual consumers.122
The Second Circuit further distinguished Hughes when it addressed the
pricing mechanism employed by the New York ZEC program. New York’s
ZEC program set ZEC prices in two-year increments wherein prices remained
fixed for that two-year period—this effectively sets a cap on ZEC prices
so they do not fluctuate according to the wholesale clearing price.123 New
York ZEC prices are initially based on the social cost of carbon and adjusted
based on forecast wholesale prices.124 This pricing method contrasts with
the “contract for differences” approach in Hughes, wherein the mechanism
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
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directly insulated a power generator from wholesale market fluctuations.125
Moreover, ZEC prices in New York’s program may adjust based on the
amount of renewable energy generation in the state’s energy mix, thus
reflecting the purpose of New York’s program: to use nuclear power as a
bridge to a renewable energy future.126
In rejecting plaintiffs’ conflict preemption claim, the Second Circuit found
the ZEC program did not do clear damage to federal energy goals.127 Plaintiffs
argued that to keep otherwise uneconomic plants running resulted in distorted
prices, and it thwarted FERC’s goal to maintain an efficient wholesale market.
The court noted, however, that FERC previously sanctioned state programs
that increased capacity or impact wholesale market prices, as long as the states
acted within their jurisdiction.128 The Second Circuit then concluded: “[t]hus,
states may grant loans, subsidies or tax credits to particular facilities
on environmental or policy grounds, including when that makes clean
generation more competitive in a cost comparison with fossil‐fueled generation
or allows states to affect the price.”129
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR STATE POLICIES IN POWER GENERATION
The entire energy sector is in a state of transition. The widespread
desire to decarbonize electricity production resulted in states’ exploration
of policies designed to rapidly reduce GHG emissions. This is particularly
true in the face of continued federal inaction on price determinations or
GHG regulations.130 State renewable clean energy goals, along with
challenges presented by intermittent renewables, have states pursuing a
wide variety of technologies and policies—from DERs, battery storage,
and demand side management, to feed-in-tariffs and renewable portfolio
standards (RPS), ZEC and REC programs, and more.131 Such innovative,
125. See supra text accompanying notes 51–54.
126. See Coal. for Competitive Elec., Dynegy Inc., 906 F.3d at 47–48 (explaining the
price of ZECs in New York may be reduced in part by entry of new sources of renewable
generation, “reflecting the reduced value of nuclear plants if renewable generation gains
steam.”).
127. Id. at 57.
128. Id. at 56.
129. Id. at 57 (internal citations omitted).
130. See Brad Plumer, A ‘Green New Deal’ Is Far From Reality, but Climate Action
Is Picking Up in the States, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/
02/08/climate/states-global-warming.html [https://perma.cc/ZMS2-AMZQ].
131. See STATE RENEWABLE ENERGY RESOURCES, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://
www.epa.gov/statelocalenergy/state-renewable-energy-resources [https://perma.cc/7PGW-
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yet sweeping changes disrupt the energy system and do not seamlessly fit
within traditional sectoral divisions of the electric industry.132 This presents
unique challenges for contemporary regulation in the energy sector.
A noted above, a hallmark of the Court’s jurisprudential era of dual
federalism was a bright line rule that separated federal and state regulatory
authority. The Court’s recent shift toward a cooperative federalism framework
better accommodates the dynamic and evolving energy sector.133 Throughout
this shift, the Court urged lower courts to be especially cautious in their
preemption inquiries, which in turn granted states a wide berth to experiment
with ways to encourage new or clean power generation. Courts in the ZEC
cases heeded the Supreme Court’s instructions and refused to find field
preemption merely because state polices could have a significant effect on
wholesale markets.134 Because both the Seventh and Second Circuits affirmed
the district courts’ rulings on the state ZECs programs, it seems unlikely the
Supreme Court will take up the ZEC issue.
The circuit courts’ analyses in both ZEC cases centered on FERC’s authority
to take countervailing actions if it found the programs undermined its
mandate to ensure just and reasonable wholesale rates.135 For example, at
the time of this writing, FERC has an ongoing hearing to address the impacts
of state policies on PJM’s capacity market.136 While any final order may impact
what programs states may implement, FERC remains committed, at least
in its language, to preserving state authority to regulate power generation.137

WYKN] (providing background on different technologies and policies available to states
pursuing clean energy policies or initiatives).
132. E.g., A Strategic Overview of the Global Energy Markets, WORLD ENERGY MKTS.
OBSERVATORY 21 (Perry Stoneman, et al. eds., 20th ed. 2018), https://www.capgemini.com/
wp-content/uploads/2019/03/World-Energy-Markets-Observatory-2018v1.pdf [https://perma.cc/
Z5U4-N5EA].
133. See generally, Daniel A. Lyons, Protecting States in the New World of Energy
Federalism, 67 EMORY L. J. 921 (2018) (discussing the new age of concurrent jurisdiction
in energy regulation and suggesting ways states may preserve authority in energy policy
decisions).
134. See supra Part IV.
135. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. Star, 904 F.3d 518, 524 (7th Cir. 2018); Coal. for
Competitive Elec., Dynegy Inc. v. Zibelman, 272 F. Supp. 3d 554, 577 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
136. See Gavin Bade, PJM Aims for Middle in Defense of Capacity Market Plan at
FERC, UTIL. DIVE (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/pjm-aims-for-middle- indefense-of-capacity-market-plan-at-ferc/541762/ [https://perma.cc/9DUY-ZZL6]; Gavin
Bade, PJM to Ask FERC to Invalidate Its Energy Market Rules After Stakeholder Impasse,
UTIL. DIVE (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/pjm-to-ask-ferc-to-invalidateits-energy-market-rules-after-stakeholder-imp/548585/ [https://perma.cc/RL8G-493E].
137. This is so at least in regard to preserving state authority when state regulations
do not “target” areas reserved by Congress for federal regulation. E.g., Brief for the U.S.
and FERC, Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. Star, 904 F.3d 518 (7th Cir. 2018) (No. 05-2433),
supra note 85, at 18.
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In Calpine Corp., the ongoing FERC hearing focused on state subsidy
impacts on the capacity market, FERC noted that its proposed rule changes,
“in no way divest[] the states in the PJM region of their jurisdiction over
generation facilities. States may continue to support their preferred types
of resources in pursuit of state policy goals.”138 Some commentators suggested
FERC’s proposed bifurcated system—with a reduced capacity market and
resource-specific FRR alternatives—benefits states interested in renewable
resources because it may provide states with more options through which
to procure their respective loads.139 Specifically, FERC’s proposed system
might allow LSEs to bilaterally contract for renewables, or any other statesupported resource, for only a portion of their load.140 Furthermore, any
FERC order the states perceive as undermining states’ ability to regulate
generation facilities will be subject to judicial review, as the courts in the
ZEC cases noted.141
Energy law scholar Jim Rossi argues that, in light of Hughes, the key
inquiry for a preemption issue is whether a state law targets a federal
regulation.142 The thrust of Rossi’s argument is that states should have the
ability to pursue any number of measures designed to address energy attributes—
like carbon emissions or environmental benefits that FERC-regulated wholesale
markets do not price—as long as they do not target, and thus directly conflict
with, a “federal regulatory initiative.”143
Rossi’s view aligns with both the district and circuit courts’ views in
Coalition for Competitive Electricity, where, for instance, the judges found

138. Calpine Corp. v. PJM Interconnection, LLC, 163 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,236 at ¶ 158.
139. See Gavin Bade, How FERC’s ‘unprecedented’ PJM order could unravel capacity
markets, UTIL.DIVE (July 3, 2018), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/how-fercs-unprecedentedpjm-order-could-unravel-capacity-markets/527053/ [https://perma.cc/8AB6-YW5S].
140. Id.
141. See, e.g., Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. Star, 904 F.3d 518, 524 (7th Cir. 2018)
(“Once the Commission reaches a final decision in the ongoing proceeding, the adequacy
of its adjustments will be subject to judicial review; the need to make adjustments in light
of states’ exercise of their lawful powers does not diminish the scope of those powers.”).
142. Rossi, supra note 2, at 450 (“. . . in assessing preemption the Court’s decision[]
in . . . Hughes show[s] that the key inquiry is whether a state law targets a federal regulation.”)
(citing Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1298 (2016)). FERC also used
this specific “target” language in its amici brief to the Seventh Circuit. See Brief for the
U.S. and FERC, Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. Star, 904 F.3d 518 (7th Cir. 2018) (No. 05-2433),
supra note 85, at 7 (arguing in part the Illinois ZEC program was not preempted because
“the Illinois ZEC is ‘targeted’ at an attribute of generation resources over which Illinois has
regulatory authority.”).
143. Rossi, supra note 2, at 450–51.
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no conflict between FERC’s operation of the wholesale energy market and
the New York PSC’s choice to price environmental attributes to make up
for the wholesale market’s failure to do so.144 Rossi emphasizes that courts
must focus on whether a preemption finding, “advances or hinders the statutory
purpose of avoiding a regulatory no man’s land in energy markets—a question
entirely ignored by previous precedents that embrace dual sovereignty.”145
This view squares with the Court’s opinions in EPSA and Hughes which both
emphasized the FPA’s underlying purpose of as the key to any preemption
analysis in this context. Notably, judges in the ZEC cases echoed this reasoning
as well.146
In the closing paragraph of the Hughes opinion, the Court listed a number
of ways states may encourage new or clean generation. These include tax
incentives, land grants, direct subsidies, construction of state-owned generation
facilities, and re-regulation of the energy sector.147 According to the Court,
as long as any subsidies payment was not conditioned on a bid clearing a
wholesale auction, such policies would not run afoul of Hughes.148 Based
on recent cases, states would benefit if their respective new or clean generation
policies clarify that such policies target power generation or retail services,
and that effects on wholesale markets are merely incidental, rather than the
aim of the policies.
States may also encourage renewable energy through feed-in tariffs (FITs).
FITs require utilities to purchase renewable power at a fixed, presumably
above-market rate.149 Felix Mormann, a faculty fellow at Stanford’s SteyerTaylor Center for Energy Policy and Finance, suggests the state level is the
best regulatory match for FIT programs, as PURPA already grants states with
much of the authority necessary to implement FIT programs.150 PURPA
allows states to require utilities to purchase electricity that particular qualifyingfacility renewable generators feed into the grid.151 Because states also have
jurisdiction over retail electricity rates, they can help utilities recoup costs

144. Coal. for Competitive Elec., Dynegy Inc. v. Zibelman, 906 F.3d 41, 57 (2d Cir. 2018).
145. Rossi, supra note 2, at 451.
146. See, e.g., Coal. for Competitive Elec., Dynergy Inc. v. Zibelman, 272 F. Supp. 3d
554, 567 (2017) (“In considering a federal law’s preemptive effect, ‘the ultimate touchstone’ is
Congress’s purpose in enacting the law.”) (citing Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC,
136 S. Ct. 1288, 1297 (2016)).
147. Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1299.
148. Id.
149. Feed-In Tariff: A Policy Tool Encouraging Deployment of Renewable Electricity
Technologies, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (May 30, 2013), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/
detail.php?id=11471 [https://perma.cc/3Q4E-554A].
150. Felix Mormann, Clean Energy Federalism, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1621, 1653 (2015)
(citing 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (2012); 18 C.F.R. §§ 292.303(c), 292.306(a) (1985)).
151. Id. at 1653.
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through surcharges or a system benefits charge.152 However, FIT programs
based on PURPA would be limited to QFs (small power generation facilities
of 80 MW or less).153
Alternatively, states may consider mandated long-term bilateral contracts
for large renewable generators as a more comprehensive program with effects
similar to FITs. A mandated contract would bypass wholesale market auctions
entirely, thus preventing conflict like that in Hughes between state regulation
of in-state power generation and federal regulation of wholesale markets.154
In Hughes, the Court distinguished traditional bilateral contracts for capacity
from the “contract for differences” in Maryland’s energy policy, where
payment under the “contract for differences” was contingent on capacity
market participation.155 As the Hughes Court noted, bilateral contracts for
electricity do not present such conflicts because FERC may still review the
rate for reasonableness.156 Still, neither FERC nor courts seem to value energy
attributes like zero emissions.157 Thus, if a state policy is clear in how and
why the state choses to value a non-market energy attribute, it will likely
pass scrutiny.
Although some states demonstrated interest in aggressive pursuits for
decarbonization of electricity production, this is certainly not true of all states.
Further, states’ policy latitude in the wake of EPSA and Hughes is not limited
to renewable energy. For example, nothing would prevent a state from
subsidizing coal or natural gas generators in the name of reliability, jobs,
or local industry.158 Thus, the cooperative federalism framework itself is
neutral and fuel source agnostic.

152. Id. (citing 18 C.F.R. § 292.303(a) (1985)).
153. Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (2012)).
154. See supra text accompanying notes 55–58.
155. Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1294–95 (2017).
156. Id. at 1292–93.
157. E.g., Thaddeus Swanek, FERC Looks At Ways to Compensate Plants for Their
Resiliency, NUCLEAR ENERGY INST., https://www.nei.org/news/2018/ferc-looking-wayscompensate-plants-resiliency [https://perma.cc/649V-ME3L] (discussing FERC plans to
reward plants with 90-day on-site fuel stores for “reliability” purposes and states’ concerns
this initiative will replace clean energy plants with fossil fuel plants “mak[ing] it almost
impossible to reach [states’] clean energy goals.”).
158. See Rossi, supra note 2, at 453 (noting that federal regulation of power grid reliability
functions as a floor, above which that states can enact more rigorous reliability standards).
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VI. CONCLUSION
It is impossible to predict the significance or permanency of the Supreme
Court’s shift toward cooperative energy federalism. However, EPSA and
Hughes seem to mark a turning point in energy industry regulation. These
cases reject a dual federalism framework characterized by jurisdictional
bright lines and instead emphasize the cooperative nature of state and federal
energy regulation, as well as the purpose of the FPA. By following the
Court’s model, lower courts may avoid field preemption analyses altogether.
Though judges in the two ZEC cases conducted field preemption inquiries,
they were fairly hostile to a strict division of regulatory fields and instead
followed the Court’s cooperative federalism directives in EPSA and Hughes.
Of course, a shift in the Court’s balance and views may drive energy regulation
in the other direction, rendering EPSA and Hughes somewhat anomalous
in the Court’s jurisprudence. That said, changes in the energy sector
suggest this is unlikely, as technological shifts continue to accelerate the
interconnectedness of state and federal regulation.159
The Court’s recent decisions have one overarching positive implication
for states: they should enjoy more leeway to experiment with policies designed
to promote new or clean power generation, as courts are now less likely to
find preemption of such policies. The ZEC cases illustrate this, though only
time and additional cases will demonstrate the true significance of this
shift to a cooperative energy federalism.
FERC also has a significant role to play in the cooperative federalism
framework, and it may act to either enhance or restrict the paths opened by
the courts’ shift. So far, FERC demonstrated restraint in not intervening with
recent state policies that value energy attributes, even when the policies impact
wholesale energy markets.160
Together, the recent Supreme Court cases, subsequent lower court decisions,
and FERC’s regulatory and administrative activities all suggest states may
now pursue their energy policy goals with more confidence than in recent
past—particularly without fear of a definitive preemption ruling if FERC
challenges such policies in court. With action on climate change ever more
pressing to many state legislatures, state energy policies will likely continue
to put these regulatory shifts to the test.
159. See Lyons, supra note 133.
160. FERC’s final order in the ongoing matter related to PJM’s capacity markets has
the potential to undermine this. Still, FERC operated collaboratively in other contexts with
policies like demand response and net energy metering in which FERC offered states the option
of either opting out of the relevant FERC rules or approaching regulation in a different manner.
See FERC, 2018 ASSESSMENT OF DEMAND RESPONSE AND ADVANCED METERING 25–27
(Nov. 2018), https://www.ferc.gov/legal/staff-reports/2018/DR-AM-Report2018.pdf [https://
perma.cc/YX5Q-D8LW].
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